# Paper C: The Commitment Trap ## Table of Contents with Abstract, Figures, Tables **Source of Truth:** `[[๐Ÿ“ขBULLETIN]]` **Registry:** `[[๐Ÿ—„๏ธREGISTRY]]` --- ## ๐Ÿ“œ ABSTRACT When does the very commitment that secures funding become a trap? Analyzing a panel of **123,906 ventures**, we document the **Capital-Flexibility Paradox**: early capital ($E$) systematically reduces strategic flexibility (|ฮ”V|), yet flexibility significantly predicts growth ($\rho = +0.159$, $p < 0.001$). Flexible ventures achieve **2.7ร— higher growth** compared to rigid ones. We verify three hypotheses: **H1** confirms that among ventures with similar early funding, more flexible ones grow faster ($\rho = +0.158$). **H2** shows that controlling for initial vagueness, more capital leads to less flexibility ($\rho = -0.052$). Most strikingly, **H3** reveals that capital's effect on growth varies by positioning: it *hurts* Analyst-channel ventures (Low V: $\rho = -0.05$) but *helps* Believer-channel ventures (High V: $\rho = +0.08$). This pattern aligns with Paper U's U-shape: the "Murky Middle" gets trapped in their commitments, while the extremes either escape through flexibility (Believer) or thrive through focus (Analyst). We introduce the concept of **Abandonment Option Cost (AOC)** to explain why capital crystallizes into a "Golden Cage." **Keywords:** Commitment Trap, Capital-Flexibility Paradox, Abandonment Option Cost, Golden Cage, Strategic Flexibility --- ## ๐Ÿ“‘ TABLE OF CONTENTS ### Section 1: Introduction (ยถ43-49) โ†’ File: `[[section1(c)]]` | ยถ | Role | First Sentence | |:-:|:-----|:---------------| | 43 | ๐Ÿ“ฟ ๋ณต์Œ | RBV: ๋” ๋งŽ์€ ์ž๋ณธ โ†’ ๋” ๋งŽ์€ ์‹คํ—˜ โ†’ ๋” ๋‚˜์€ ์„ฑ๊ณผ (Barney 1991). | | 44 | ๐Ÿงฉ ํผ์ฆ | ๊ทธ๋Ÿฌ๋‚˜ ์œ ์—ฐํ•œ ๋ฒค์ฒ˜๊ฐ€ ๊ฒฝ์ง๋œ ๋ฒค์ฒ˜๋ณด๋‹ค **2.7ร—** ๋” ์„ฑ์žฅ. | | 45 | ๐Ÿ˜ฎ RQ | ์ดˆ๊ธฐ ์„ฑ๊ณต์ด **ํ•จ์ •**์ด ๋˜๋Š” ์กฐ๊ฑด์€? | | 46 | ๐Ÿ”Ž ๋ Œ์ฆˆ | ๋ฐ˜์‚ฌ์‹ค์  ๋น„์šฉ ํ”„๋ ˆ์ž„์›Œํฌ: E[Y\|์œ ์—ฐ] - E[Y\|๊ณ ์ •]. | | 47 | ๐Ÿ˜† ํ•ด๋ฒ• | ์ž๋ณธ โ†’ ํ—Œ์‹  โ†’ ๋™์งˆํ™” โ†’ ํ•™์Šต ์ฐจ๋‹จ. | | 48 | ๐Ÿ—บ๏ธ ์ธ์ ‘ | Nanda (2020), Kerr et al. (2014)์™€์˜ ์ฐจ๋ณ„์ . | | 49 | ๐Ÿ—„๏ธ ๋กœ๋“œ๋งต | 2์ ˆ ์ด๋ก , 3์ ˆ ์‹ค์ฆ, 4์ ˆ ๋…ผ์˜. | ### Section 2: Theory (ยถ50-58) โ†’ File: `[[section2(c)]]` | ยถ | Role | First Sentence | Asset | |:-:|:-----|:---------------|:------| | 50 | ๋ฌธํ—Œ: ์ž์› | RBV โ€” Hโ‚€: ์ž์›์ด ์‹คํ—˜์„ ๋•๋Š”๋‹ค. | | | 51 | ๋ฌธํ—Œ: ๊ฒฝ์ง์„ฑ | Leonard-Barton (1992) ํ•ต์‹ฌ ๊ฒฝ์ง์„ฑ. | | | 52 | ๋ฌธํ—Œ: ํ”ผ๋ฒ— | Ries (2011), McDonald & Gao (2019). | | | 53 | ๊ฐญ | ์ž์› ํ’์š” โ†’ ํ”ผ๋ฒ— ๋น„์šฉ ์ฆ๊ฐ€์˜ ์ •๋Ÿ‰ํ™” ๋ถ€์žฌ. | | | 54 | ๋ฉ”์ปค๋‹ˆ์ฆ˜: AOC | ํฌ๊ธฐ ์˜ต์…˜ ๋น„์šฉ(AOC) ๋„์ž…. | | | 55 | ๋ฉ”์ปค๋‹ˆ์ฆ˜: Golden Cage | ๋†’์€ E โ†’ ๋†’์€ AOC โ†’ ํ˜„์ƒ ์œ ์ง€ ๊ฐ•์ œ. | `[[๐Ÿ–ผ๏ธC_S2_mechanism]]` | | 56 | ๊ณ„๋ณด: Real Options | Put Option ํ–‰์‚ฌ ๊ฐ€๊ฒฉ โ†” AOC. | | | 57 | ๋ชจ๋ธ | ์„ธ ๊ฐ€์ง€ ๊ฐ€์„ค: H1, H2, H3. | | | 58 | ๊ฐ€์„ค | **H2: ๊ฐ™์€ V โ†’ ๋” ๋งŽ์€ E โ†’ ๋œ ์œ ์—ฐ**. | | ### Section 3: Empirics (ยถ59-69) โ†’ File: `[[section3(c)]]` | ยถ | Role | First Sentence | Asset | |:-:|:-----|:---------------|:------| | 59 | ๋งฅ๋ฝ | Paper U์˜ ๋ถ€๋ถ„์ง‘ํ•ฉ: **N = 133,945** ํŒจ๋„. | | | 60 | ํ‘œ๋ณธ | 2010-2018 ์ฝ”ํ˜ธํŠธ, 5๋…„ ์ถ”์ . | | | 61 | DV | Y = total_raised / first_financing_size. | | | 62 | IV | \|ฮ”V\| = ์ „๋žต์  ์œ ์—ฐ์„ฑ. | | | 63 | ์กฐ์ ˆ | E = ์ดˆ๊ธฐ ์ž๋ณธ. | | | 64 | ๊ธฐ์ˆ ํ†ต๊ณ„ | **ฯ(E, \|ฮ”V\|)_within_V = -0.052***. | `[[๐Ÿ—„๏ธC_S3_correlations]]` | | 65 | ์‹๋ณ„ | V decile ๋‚ด ๋ถ„์„์œผ๋กœ ๋‚ด์ƒ์„ฑ ํ†ต์ œ. | | | 66 | ๋ช…์„ธ | ์„ธ ๊ฐ€์„ค ๊ฒ€์ •. | | | 67 | H1,H2,H3 | **Three Hypotheses Verified**. | `[[๐Ÿ–ผ๏ธC_S3_hypotheses]]` `[[๐Ÿ—„๏ธC_S3_hypotheses]]` | | 68 | Decile | ์ž๋ณธ ์‹ญ๋ถ„์œ„๋ณ„ ์œ ์—ฐ์„ฑ ๊ฐ์†Œ. | `[[๐Ÿ–ผ๏ธC_S3_decile]]` | | 69 | Gap | **Flexibility Gap = 2.7ร—**. | `[[๐Ÿ–ผ๏ธC_S3_cohort]]` `[[๐Ÿ—„๏ธC_S3_gap]]` | ### Section 4: Discussion (ยถ70-74) โ†’ File: `[[section4(c)]]` | ยถ | Role | First Sentence | |:-:|:-----|:---------------| | 70 | ๊ณตํ—Œ 1 | "Golden Cage" ์‹ค์ฆ: ๋ˆ์€ ๊ธฐํšŒ๊ฐ€ ์•„๋‹ˆ๋ผ ์กฑ์‡„. | | 71 | ๊ณตํ—Œ 2 | ํ”ผ๋ฒ— ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์— ๋น„์šฉ ๊ด€์  ํ†ตํ•ฉ: AOC โˆ E. | | 72 | ๊ณตํ—Œ 3 | ํˆฌ์ž์ž ๊ฒฝ๊ณ : ๊ณผ๋„ํ•œ ์ดˆ๊ธฐ ์ž๋ณธ์ด ์˜ต์…˜ ๊ฐ€์น˜ ํŒŒ๊ดด. | | 73 | ํ•œ๊ณ„ | AOC ์ธก์ •์˜ ๊ฐ„์ ‘์„ฑ; ์ง์ ‘ ์ธก์ • ํ•„์š”. | | 74 | ๊ฒฐ๋ก  | ์„ฑ๊ณต์€ ์ž์› ์ถ•์ ์ด ์•„๋‹Œ **์œ ์—ฐ์„ฑ ์œ ์ง€**์— ๋‹ฌ๋ ค ์žˆ์Œ. | --- ## ๐Ÿ–ผ๏ธ LIST OF FIGURES | # | Module | Caption | Page | |:-:|:-------|:--------|:----:| | C.1 | `[[๐Ÿ–ผ๏ธC_S2_mechanism]]` | The Capital-Flexibility-Growth Mechanism | TBD | | C.2 | `[[๐Ÿ–ผ๏ธC_S3_hypotheses]]` | Three Hypotheses Verification | TBD | | C.3 | `[[๐Ÿ–ผ๏ธC_S3_decile]]` | Commitment Cost by Early Funding Decile | TBD | | C.4 | `[[๐Ÿ–ผ๏ธC_S3_cohort]]` | The 2.7ร— Flexibility Gap | TBD | --- ## ๐Ÿ—„๏ธ LIST OF TABLES | # | Module | Caption | Page | |:-:|:-------|:--------|:----:| | C.1 | `[[๐Ÿ—„๏ธC_S3_correlations]]` | Key Correlations | TBD | | C.2 | `[[๐Ÿ—„๏ธC_S3_hypotheses]]` | Three Hypotheses Test Results | TBD | | C.3 | `[[๐Ÿ—„๏ธC_S3_gap]]` | The 2.7ร— Flexibility Gap | TBD | --- ## ๐Ÿ“Š KEY NUMBERS (from [[๐Ÿ“ขBULLETIN]]) | Metric | Value | |:-------|:------| | Panel Sample | **123,906** | | ฯ(Y, \|ฮ”V\|) | **+0.159***| | ฯ(E, \|ฮ”V\|)_within_V | **-0.052*** | | Flexibility Gap | **2.7ร—** | | H1 (Flexibilityโ†’Growth) | ฯ = +0.158*** | | H2 (Capitalโ†’Less Flex) | ฯ = -0.052*** | | H3 Low-V | ฯ = -0.05 | | H3 High-V | ฯ = +0.08 | --- ## ๐Ÿ”— CROSS-PAPER LINKS | To Paper | Connection | |:---------|:-----------| | โ†’ U | H3 pattern mirrors U-shape: extremes thrive, middle suffers | | โ†’ N | AOC feeds into CR calculation for optimal k* | --- *Paper C managed by ๐ŸŸ G + ๐ŸŸขJ* *Verified by ๐Ÿ”ดK*