# Paper C: The Commitment Trap
## Table of Contents with Abstract, Figures, Tables
**Source of Truth:** `[[๐ขBULLETIN]]`
**Registry:** `[[๐๏ธREGISTRY]]`
---
## ๐ ABSTRACT
When does the very commitment that secures funding become a trap? Analyzing a panel of **123,906 ventures**, we document the **Capital-Flexibility Paradox**: early capital ($E$) systematically reduces strategic flexibility (|ฮV|), yet flexibility significantly predicts growth ($\rho = +0.159$, $p < 0.001$). Flexible ventures achieve **2.7ร higher growth** compared to rigid ones.
We verify three hypotheses: **H1** confirms that among ventures with similar early funding, more flexible ones grow faster ($\rho = +0.158$). **H2** shows that controlling for initial vagueness, more capital leads to less flexibility ($\rho = -0.052$). Most strikingly, **H3** reveals that capital's effect on growth varies by positioning: it *hurts* Analyst-channel ventures (Low V: $\rho = -0.05$) but *helps* Believer-channel ventures (High V: $\rho = +0.08$).
This pattern aligns with Paper U's U-shape: the "Murky Middle" gets trapped in their commitments, while the extremes either escape through flexibility (Believer) or thrive through focus (Analyst). We introduce the concept of **Abandonment Option Cost (AOC)** to explain why capital crystallizes into a "Golden Cage."
**Keywords:** Commitment Trap, Capital-Flexibility Paradox, Abandonment Option Cost, Golden Cage, Strategic Flexibility
---
## ๐ TABLE OF CONTENTS
### Section 1: Introduction (ยถ43-49)
โ File: `[[section1(c)]]`
| ยถ | Role | First Sentence |
|:-:|:-----|:---------------|
| 43 | ๐ฟ ๋ณต์ | RBV: ๋ ๋ง์ ์๋ณธ โ ๋ ๋ง์ ์คํ โ ๋ ๋์ ์ฑ๊ณผ (Barney 1991). |
| 44 | ๐งฉ ํผ์ฆ | ๊ทธ๋ฌ๋ ์ ์ฐํ ๋ฒค์ฒ๊ฐ ๊ฒฝ์ง๋ ๋ฒค์ฒ๋ณด๋ค **2.7ร** ๋ ์ฑ์ฅ. |
| 45 | ๐ฎ RQ | ์ด๊ธฐ ์ฑ๊ณต์ด **ํจ์ **์ด ๋๋ ์กฐ๊ฑด์? |
| 46 | ๐ ๋ ์ฆ | ๋ฐ์ฌ์ค์ ๋น์ฉ ํ๋ ์์ํฌ: E[Y\|์ ์ฐ] - E[Y\|๊ณ ์ ]. |
| 47 | ๐ ํด๋ฒ | ์๋ณธ โ ํ์ โ ๋์งํ โ ํ์ต ์ฐจ๋จ. |
| 48 | ๐บ๏ธ ์ธ์ | Nanda (2020), Kerr et al. (2014)์์ ์ฐจ๋ณ์ . |
| 49 | ๐๏ธ ๋ก๋๋งต | 2์ ์ด๋ก , 3์ ์ค์ฆ, 4์ ๋
ผ์. |
### Section 2: Theory (ยถ50-58)
โ File: `[[section2(c)]]`
| ยถ | Role | First Sentence | Asset |
|:-:|:-----|:---------------|:------|
| 50 | ๋ฌธํ: ์์ | RBV โ Hโ: ์์์ด ์คํ์ ๋๋๋ค. | |
| 51 | ๋ฌธํ: ๊ฒฝ์ง์ฑ | Leonard-Barton (1992) ํต์ฌ ๊ฒฝ์ง์ฑ. | |
| 52 | ๋ฌธํ: ํผ๋ฒ | Ries (2011), McDonald & Gao (2019). | |
| 53 | ๊ฐญ | ์์ ํ์ โ ํผ๋ฒ ๋น์ฉ ์ฆ๊ฐ์ ์ ๋ํ ๋ถ์ฌ. | |
| 54 | ๋ฉ์ปค๋์ฆ: AOC | ํฌ๊ธฐ ์ต์
๋น์ฉ(AOC) ๋์
. | |
| 55 | ๋ฉ์ปค๋์ฆ: Golden Cage | ๋์ E โ ๋์ AOC โ ํ์ ์ ์ง ๊ฐ์ . | `[[๐ผ๏ธC_S2_mechanism]]` |
| 56 | ๊ณ๋ณด: Real Options | Put Option ํ์ฌ ๊ฐ๊ฒฉ โ AOC. | |
| 57 | ๋ชจ๋ธ | ์ธ ๊ฐ์ง ๊ฐ์ค: H1, H2, H3. | |
| 58 | ๊ฐ์ค | **H2: ๊ฐ์ V โ ๋ ๋ง์ E โ ๋ ์ ์ฐ**. | |
### Section 3: Empirics (ยถ59-69)
โ File: `[[section3(c)]]`
| ยถ | Role | First Sentence | Asset |
|:-:|:-----|:---------------|:------|
| 59 | ๋งฅ๋ฝ | Paper U์ ๋ถ๋ถ์งํฉ: **N = 133,945** ํจ๋. | |
| 60 | ํ๋ณธ | 2010-2018 ์ฝํธํธ, 5๋
์ถ์ . | |
| 61 | DV | Y = total_raised / first_financing_size. | |
| 62 | IV | \|ฮV\| = ์ ๋ต์ ์ ์ฐ์ฑ. | |
| 63 | ์กฐ์ | E = ์ด๊ธฐ ์๋ณธ. | |
| 64 | ๊ธฐ์ ํต๊ณ | **ฯ(E, \|ฮV\|)_within_V = -0.052***. | `[[๐๏ธC_S3_correlations]]` |
| 65 | ์๋ณ | V decile ๋ด ๋ถ์์ผ๋ก ๋ด์์ฑ ํต์ . | |
| 66 | ๋ช
์ธ | ์ธ ๊ฐ์ค ๊ฒ์ . | |
| 67 | H1,H2,H3 | **Three Hypotheses Verified**. | `[[๐ผ๏ธC_S3_hypotheses]]` `[[๐๏ธC_S3_hypotheses]]` |
| 68 | Decile | ์๋ณธ ์ญ๋ถ์๋ณ ์ ์ฐ์ฑ ๊ฐ์. | `[[๐ผ๏ธC_S3_decile]]` |
| 69 | Gap | **Flexibility Gap = 2.7ร**. | `[[๐ผ๏ธC_S3_cohort]]` `[[๐๏ธC_S3_gap]]` |
### Section 4: Discussion (ยถ70-74)
โ File: `[[section4(c)]]`
| ยถ | Role | First Sentence |
|:-:|:-----|:---------------|
| 70 | ๊ณตํ 1 | "Golden Cage" ์ค์ฆ: ๋์ ๊ธฐํ๊ฐ ์๋๋ผ ์กฑ์. |
| 71 | ๊ณตํ 2 | ํผ๋ฒ ์ฐ๊ตฌ์ ๋น์ฉ ๊ด์ ํตํฉ: AOC โ E. |
| 72 | ๊ณตํ 3 | ํฌ์์ ๊ฒฝ๊ณ : ๊ณผ๋ํ ์ด๊ธฐ ์๋ณธ์ด ์ต์
๊ฐ์น ํ๊ดด. |
| 73 | ํ๊ณ | AOC ์ธก์ ์ ๊ฐ์ ์ฑ; ์ง์ ์ธก์ ํ์. |
| 74 | ๊ฒฐ๋ก | ์ฑ๊ณต์ ์์ ์ถ์ ์ด ์๋ **์ ์ฐ์ฑ ์ ์ง**์ ๋ฌ๋ ค ์์. |
---
## ๐ผ๏ธ LIST OF FIGURES
| # | Module | Caption | Page |
|:-:|:-------|:--------|:----:|
| C.1 | `[[๐ผ๏ธC_S2_mechanism]]` | The Capital-Flexibility-Growth Mechanism | TBD |
| C.2 | `[[๐ผ๏ธC_S3_hypotheses]]` | Three Hypotheses Verification | TBD |
| C.3 | `[[๐ผ๏ธC_S3_decile]]` | Commitment Cost by Early Funding Decile | TBD |
| C.4 | `[[๐ผ๏ธC_S3_cohort]]` | The 2.7ร Flexibility Gap | TBD |
---
## ๐๏ธ LIST OF TABLES
| # | Module | Caption | Page |
|:-:|:-------|:--------|:----:|
| C.1 | `[[๐๏ธC_S3_correlations]]` | Key Correlations | TBD |
| C.2 | `[[๐๏ธC_S3_hypotheses]]` | Three Hypotheses Test Results | TBD |
| C.3 | `[[๐๏ธC_S3_gap]]` | The 2.7ร Flexibility Gap | TBD |
---
## ๐ KEY NUMBERS (from [[๐ขBULLETIN]])
| Metric | Value |
|:-------|:------|
| Panel Sample | **123,906** |
| ฯ(Y, \|ฮV\|) | **+0.159***|
| ฯ(E, \|ฮV\|)_within_V | **-0.052*** |
| Flexibility Gap | **2.7ร** |
| H1 (FlexibilityโGrowth) | ฯ = +0.158*** |
| H2 (CapitalโLess Flex) | ฯ = -0.052*** |
| H3 Low-V | ฯ = -0.05 |
| H3 High-V | ฯ = +0.08 |
---
## ๐ CROSS-PAPER LINKS
| To Paper | Connection |
|:---------|:-----------|
| โ U | H3 pattern mirrors U-shape: extremes thrive, middle suffers |
| โ N | AOC feeds into CR calculation for optimal k* |
---
*Paper C managed by ๐ G + ๐ขJ*
*Verified by ๐ดK*