# ๐๏ธ๐
- 14.282 Enhanced Module Guide
> *"Visible hands build equilibria through incentives, authority, and relationships"*
---
## ๐ How to Use This Guide
This enhanced guide adds **Critical Insights Tables** inspired by [[23_15357]]'s format:
- ๐ก **Critical Insight**: The "aha!" moment from each concept
- ๐ **Memorable Takeaway**: One-liner to remember
- ๐ **Application**: Real-world or research application
---
## Module 1: Pay for Performance ๐ข
### ๐ Core Concepts
| **Concept** | ๐ก **Critical Insight** | ๐ **Memorable Takeaway** | ๐ **Application** |
| -------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------ | -------------------------------------------- |
| **Moral Hazard** | Agents choose hidden actions that affect outcomes | "Can't see effort โ pay for luck" | Why founders need equity, not salary |
| **Multi-tasking** | Multiple tasks โ effort distortion toward measured ones | "What gets measured gets gamed" | Why pure KPIs hurt innovation |
| **Career Concerns** | Future reputation incentivizes current effort | "Work hard today, shine tomorrow" | Why junior researchers hustle without tenure |
| **Relational Contracts** | Self-enforcing promises based on future rents | "Trust needs tomorrow's profit" | Why long-term partnerships work |
| **Subjective Evaluation** | Boss's discretion complements hard metrics | "Numbers + judgment > numbers alone" | Why Google uses OKRs + manager feedback |
| **Tournaments** | Rank-based pay motivates competition | "Winner takes most" | Why sales teams have leaderboards |
| **Team Incentives** | Free-riding problem in team production | "Everyone's job = nobody's job" | Why startups need individual accountability |
| **Control vs. Incentives** | Strong relationships enable control, not just pay | "Trust unlocks orders" | Why VCs do more than write checks |
### ๐ Key Papers
| **Paper** | **One-Line Insight** | **Research Application** |
|-----------|---------------------|-------------------------|
| [[๐holmstrom79_moral_hazard]] | Risk-averse agents demand insurance premium for incentive pay | Design VC contracts with option value |
| [[๐holmstrom91_multitask]] | Can't measure innovation โ pay flat salary + relational bonus | Why R&D teams need autonomy |
| [[๐holmstrom82_career]] | Reputation markets provide implicit incentives | Model researcher effort without grants |
| [[๐levin03_relational]] | Self-enforcing contracts require patience | When do startup-investor relationships sustain? |
| [[๐bgm94_subjective]] | Subjectivity reduces gaming but requires trust | Design performance review systems |
| [[๐lazear81_tournaments]] | Competition motivates but can destroy cooperation | When to use competition in teams |
| [[๐holmstrom82_teams]] | Need budget-breaking to solve free-riding | Design founder equity splits |
| [[๐bgm23_control]] | Strong relationships โ shift from incentives to control | Evolution of startup governance |
---
## Module 2: Managers & Productivity ๐
### ๐ Core Concepts
| **Concept** | ๐ก **Critical Insight** | ๐ **Memorable Takeaway** | ๐ **Application** |
|-------------|------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|
| **Management Practices** | Simple practices (targets, monitoring, feedback) boost productivity | "Best practices travel" | Why Y Combinator teaches same playbook |
| **Practice Adoption** | Information + incentives + capacity constraints explain adoption | "Know-how โ can-do" | Why MBA doesn't guarantee success |
| **CEO Time Allocation** | CEOs spend time where marginal product is highest | "Where you spend time = what matters" | Track founder time to predict pivots |
| **Pollution Shocks** | External shocks reveal management quality | "Crisis shows who's managing" | Test startup resilience during downturns |
| **Gender & Management** | Women managers face both skill gaps and discrimination | "Barriers are both real and perceived" | Design interventions for women founders |
| **Management RCTs** | Causal evidence: management practices โ 17% productivity gain | "Management matters, causally" | Experiment with management interventions |
### ๐ Key Papers
| **Paper** | **One-Line Insight** | **Research Application** |
|-----------|---------------------|-------------------------|
| [[๐bloom13_management_india]] | RCT shows management consulting โ 17% productivity gain | Can management coaching help startups? |
| [[๐bloom19_management_drivers]] | Competition + ownership + human capital โ better management | Why competitive markets force better practices |
| [[๐bandiera20_ceo]] | CEOs allocate time to production vs. organization building | Model founder time allocation decisions |
| [[๐akn22_management_shocks]] | Air pollution reduces productivity; good managers mitigate impact | How do founders handle external shocks? |
| [[๐macchiavello20_women_managers]] | Women face skill gaps + discrimination in management roles | Design support for women entrepreneurs |
---
## Module 3: Delegation & Communication ๐พ
### ๐ Core Concepts
| **Concept** | ๐ก **Critical Insight** | ๐ **Memorable Takeaway** | ๐ **Application** |
|-------------|------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|
| **Formal Authority** | Legal right to decide | "Who signs the check" | Founder equity โ decision rights |
| **Real Authority** | Actual power to influence decisions | "Who really decides" | Why CTOs control tech stack |
| **Informal Authority** | Relationship-based influence beyond formal rights | "Influence without title" | Why advisors matter for founders |
| **Influence Activities** | Agents lobby to affect decisions โ costly distortion | "Politicking wastes resources" | Why open-door policies can backfire |
| **Delegation** | Give decision rights to informed agents | "Empower those who know" | When should founders delegate? |
| **Communication** | Sharing information shapes collective decisions | "Talk changes minds" | How do board discussions work? |
| **Knowledge Flows** | Information spreads through networks | "Who you know = what you know" | Why startup location matters |
### ๐ Key Papers
| **Paper** | **One-Line Insight** | **Research Application** |
|-----------|---------------------|-------------------------|
| [[๐aghion97_authority]] | Boss has formal authority, but expert has real authority | Model founder-CTO relationship |
| [[๐bgm99_informal]] | Relationships create informal authority beyond contracts | Why trust matters in delegation |
| [[๐milgrom88_influence]] | Agents waste resources lobbying for favorable decisions | Design organizations to minimize politics |
| [[๐bandiera21_delegation]] | RCT: delegation increases productivity when managers can monitor | When should founders delegate? |
| [[๐kala24_autonomy]] | Autonomy boosts performance but requires capability | Give authority to capable employees |
| [[๐kala25_persuasion]] | Communication changes beliefs and decisions in households | How do co-founders negotiate? |
| [[๐sandvik20_knowledge]] | Knowledge flows through workplace networks | Why co-location matters for learning |
---
## Module 4: Boundary of the Firm ๐
### ๐ Core Concepts
| **Concept** | ๐ก **Critical Insight** | ๐ **Memorable Takeaway** | ๐ **Application** |
|-------------|------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|
| **Transaction Costs** | Markets have costs (search, bargaining, enforcement) | "Markets aren't free" | Why firms exist instead of freelancers |
| **Hold-Up Problem** | Relationship-specific investment โ ex-post bargaining โ underinvestment | "Vulnerable partner underinvests" | Why Tesla vertically integrates batteries |
| **Asset Ownership** | Owner gets residual control rights | "Ownership = tiebreaker rights" | Why founders fight for equity |
| **Property Rights Theory** | Ownership affects ex ante investment incentives | "Own it โ improve it" | Design equity splits for co-founders |
| **Influence Costs** | Internal politics shape integration decisions | "Politics inside vs. contracts outside" | When outsourcing avoids politics |
| **Vertical Integration** | Own suppliers when coordination matters more than competition | "Control the bottleneck" | When startups should build vs. buy |
### ๐ Key Papers
| **Paper** | **One-Line Insight** | **Research Application** |
|-----------|---------------------|-------------------------|
| [[๐coase37_nature]] | Firms exist because organizing beats repeated market transactions | Foundational: why organize anything? |
| [[๐williamson71_integration]] | Hold-up problem โ vertical integration | Model startup supplier relationships |
| [[๐williamson79_tce]] | Transaction attributes determine governance structure | Match governance to transaction type |
| [[๐gh86_ownership]] | Asset ownership provides residual control rights | Design founder equity structures |
| [[๐hm90_property]] | Property rights affect investment incentives ex ante | How ownership shapes innovation |
| [[๐powell15_influence]] | Internal politics shape make-or-buy decisions | When to outsource to avoid politics |
| [[๐atalay14_vertical]] | Vertical integration primarily about controlling inputs, not outputs | What drives integration empirically? |
| [[๐braguinsky15_acquisitions]] | Acquisitions transfer tacit knowledge and capabilities | Why acqui-hires work |
| [[๐banerjee19_outsourcing]] | Private outsourcing can outperform public provision | Privatization vs. integration trade-offs |
---
## Module 5: Governance of Non-Integration ๐ข
### ๐ Core Concepts
| **Concept** | ๐ก **Critical Insight** | ๐ **Memorable Takeaway** | ๐ **Application** |
|-------------|------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|
| **Relational Contracts** | Self-enforcing promises sustained by future rents | "Tomorrow's profit enforces today's promise" | Why repeat business relationships work |
| **Supply Shocks** | External shocks test relationship strength | "Crisis reveals true partners" | Test investor commitment during downturns |
| **Competition Effects** | Competition can undermine relational contracts | "More options = less commitment" | Why exclusive partnerships sustain |
| **Strategic Default** | Agents default when outside options improve | "Better deal = broken promise" | Model supplier loyalty |
| **External Enforcement** | Third-party monitoring complements relationships | "Audits + trust > trust alone" | Why ESG standards help supply chains |
| **Formal-Relational Mix** | Contracts and relationships complement each other | "Paper + trust > either alone" | Design hybrid governance |
### ๐ Key Papers
| **Paper** | **One-Line Insight** | **Research Application** |
|-----------|---------------------|-------------------------|
| [[๐aghion94_innovation]] | Control allocation affects innovation incentives | Who should control R&D direction? |
| [[๐bgm02_relational]] | Relational contracts and firm boundaries co-determine | Why relationships substitute for integration |
| [[๐mm15_kenya_roses]] | Supply shock: relationships preserve trade when formal contracts fail | Value of repeat business in crises |
| [[๐mm21_rwanda_coffee]] | Competition undermines relational contracts | When competition hurts cooperation |
| [[๐blouin19_default]] | Strategic default when outside options improve | Model supplier switching |
| [[๐boudreau24_osh]] | External enforcement (OSH committees) improves compliance | How third parties sustain cooperation |
---
## Module 6: Capabilities & Culture ๐พ๐
### ๐ Core Concepts
| **Concept** | ๐ก **Critical Insight** | ๐ **Memorable Takeaway** | ๐ **Application** |
|-------------|------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|
| **State Effectiveness** | Performance depends on both individuals and organizational systems | "Talent + system = output" | Why hiring great people isn't enough |
| **Organizational Capacity** | Systems and processes matter beyond individual talent | "Process beats genius" | Build scalable operations |
| **Bureaucratic Performance** | Subjective evaluation shapes bureaucrat effort | "Evaluation systems change behavior" | Design performance reviews carefully |
| **Recognition vs. Rewards** | Non-monetary recognition can motivate as much as money | "Status = currency" | Why employee-of-month programs work |
| **Management Complementarities** | Practices work together, not in isolation | "Bundle beats cherry-picking" | Adopt management systems holistically |
| **Culture Effects** | Societal culture affects organizational practice effectiveness | "Context shapes what works" | Adapt practices to local context |
### ๐ Key Papers
| **Paper** | **One-Line Insight** | **Research Application** |
|-----------|---------------------|-------------------------|
| [[๐bhs23_state_effectiveness]] | Individual talent matters, but organizational systems matter more | Separate people effects from system effects |
| [[๐dejanvry23_china]] | Subjective evaluation shapes bureaucrat behavior | How evaluation systems affect effort |
| [[๐kala25_recognition]] | Employee recognition boosts performance like monetary rewards | Design non-monetary incentive systems |
| [[๐bgp20_contingent]] | Management practices have complementarities and contingencies | Why isolated interventions may fail |
---
## ๐ฏ Research Application Matrix
| **Research Question** | **Relevant Module** | **Key Papers** | **Battlefield** |
|---------------------|-------------------|---------------|----------------|
| How to incentivize startup experimentation? | M1 | Holmstrom 1991, Manso 2011 | ๐ข Innovation |
| When should startups outsource vs. build? | M4 | Coase 1937, GH 1986 | ๐ Operations |
| How do founder teams delegate decisions? | M3 | Aghion 1997, BGM 1999 | ๐พ Cognition |
| What sustains VC-startup relationships? | M5 | BGM 2002, MM 2015 | ๐ข Innovation |
| Why do management practices vary? | M2 | Bloom 2013, 2019 | ๐ Operations |
| How does organizational culture emerge? | M6 | BHS 2023, BGP 2020 | ๐พ Cognition/๐ Operations |
| What drives transaction cost differences? | M4 | Williamson 1979, Powell 2015 | ๐
CompBayes |
---
## ๐ก Meta-Insights Across Modules
### ๐ Formal-Relational Interaction
**Pattern**: Formal contracts and relational contracts are **complements**, not substitutes
- M1: Incentive pay + career concerns
- M3: Formal authority + informal authority
- M5: Contracts + relationships
- M6: Evaluation systems + culture
**Memorable**: *"Paper and trust work together"*
### ๐ Boundaries Are Endogenous
**Pattern**: Integration decisions depend on transaction costs, hold-up, and relationship strength
- M4: Integration when hold-up is severe
- M5: Non-integration when relationships sustain cooperation
**Memorable**: *"Own it when you can't trust the market"*
### ๐ฅ People + Systems
**Pattern**: Performance = individual talent ร organizational capacity
- M2: Management practices ร manager quality
- M6: Individual bureaucrats ร state systems
**Memorable**: *"Genius in a bad system fails; mediocrities in a good system succeed"*
---
## ๐ How This Enhances Your Research
### For ๐ข Innovation Research
- **M1**: Design incentives for R&D and experimentation
- **M5**: Model startup-investor relational contracts
- **Insight**: *Innovation needs long-term incentives and trusted partnerships*
### For ๐ Operations Research
- **M2**: Understand management practice adoption and impact
- **M4**: Model make-or-buy decisions
- **M6**: Design scalable organizational systems
- **Insight**: *Operations excellence = practices ร systems ร culture*
### For ๐พ Cognition Research
- **M3**: Model information aggregation and delegation
- **M6**: How beliefs and culture shape behavior
- **Insight**: *Cognition is embedded in organizational context*
### For ๐
CompBayes Research
- **M4**: Quantify transaction costs and property rights value
- **Insight**: *Compute optimal boundaries under uncertainty*
---
*"From incentives to authority to relationships: Visible hands build equilibria that invisible hands cannot"* - Adapted from Gibbons (2025)
โ [[14_282_org_econ]] | [[๐๏ธ๐ข๐ข_14282_modules]]